A Data-Driven Password Strength Meter for Cybersecurity Assessment and Enhancement by Algharibeh, Moath et al.
A New Data-Driven Password Strength Meter for
Enhancing Cybersecurity Using Attention Tracking
Moath M. Algharibeh





Department of Computer Science








Abstract—Password-based authentication is the most popular
authentication mechanism over insecure networks due its simplic-
ity and convenience. To ensure the security of this authentication
mechanism, measuring the strength of users’ passwords becomes
a crucial task to guide users to create stronger passwords.
However, password strength meters are only helpful if they are
accurate. Passwords meters that do not provide accurate scores
that reflect the actual passwords strengths, e.g., providing a high
score for a weak password, may misinform users and hinder
the overall security of password-based authentication mecha-
nisms. While many password strength meters were proposed in
the literature, the lack of a standardized method to measure
password strengths and comparing the accuracy of different
password meters, selecting the most appropriate password meter
will remain a difficult and unclear process.
In this paper, we propose and implement a data-driven
password meter that scrapes and collects large datasets to be
used by the proposed password strength meter to help provide
more accurate scores. Also, we measured the influence of the
proposed meter at guiding users to create stronger passwords by
tracking their eye movements. To do this, we conducted a user
study on a testing web service and monitored the eye movements
of our users using an eye tracking tool. Our results exhibited a
significant improvement by influencing 88% of users to create
an average of 150 years for password cracking-time.
Index Terms—password meter, authentication security, eye-
tracker, time-to-crack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Passwords are ubiquitous in all system aspects. It is pro-
tecting the system that contains the slightest information
to the most critical information systems. However, due to
the importance of this protection, attackers are continuously
developing new techniques in guessing and cracking users’
passwords (both offline and online). In many cases, users were
forced and guided to choose a stronger password complying
with the password policies.
Furthermore, password policies alienate users at the moment
of password creation; either as a consequence of a non-obvious
meter where users are dealing with it as a black box or by the
different results of each meter that influence users to create
a stronger password, so the need of an influencer password-
meter that genuinely guides the end-user to create a stronger
password is now essential. This paper aims to solve the lack
of user awareness regarding password creation cybersecurity
problem. As well, we have developed a new accurate, time-
efficient and dynamic technique to measure password strength
depending on the password cracking-time.
One of the leading cybersecurity problems is the password
strength; the more password is strong; the more system is
cyber secured. This paper solved one of the main problems
raised in user’s awareness in password strength creation that
could affect the user practice in all different systems as a
password acceptance criterion. Additionally, we shed light
on the lack of a user’s awareness of password creation by
the literatures. Then we used different methods to solve this
lack by influencing the end-user to create a stronger password
using a contributed and an accurate novel password-meter. The
method used to prove the effectiveness of our novel meter was
a questionnaire, the test of our contributed meter through more
than 245 participants and the test of the eye-fixation through
an eye tracker lab, then we analysed the created participant’s
passwords, and crosstab it with their questionnaire answers.
As well, we presented the key contribution out of this paper.
Furthermore, we discussed the analysis in the discussion
section, then we included the limitation of this work and how
can we mitigate these limitations in the future work section.
A. KEY FINDINGS
Reviewing the literatures in this space, apparently, reveals
some knowledge gaps both on the basic research and applied
research sides. For instance, using cracking-time as a visual
meter. Likewise, the use of eye-tracker from Human-Computer
Interaction (HCI) perspective whilst creating the password.
Finally, the use of static algorithms instead of dynamism
and automation. The following sections will address these
knowledge gaps that we have found in the literatures so far.
1) AIMS & OBJECTIVES: AIMS
• Adjust and solve the lack of user awareness on the
password creation cybersecurity problem.
• Prove a technical solution for the main problem on the
cybersecurity field (Password Creation).
OBJECTIVES
• Develop a new accurate, time-efficient and dynamic tech-
nique to measure password strength depending on the
password cracking-time.
• Study the impact of the proposed technique on how it is
influencing the end-user to create a stronger password.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
discuss the related work. In Section 3, we describe the design
of our approach, Thor. We evaluate the effectiveness and the
computational cost in Section 6. presents a brief description
of the datasets and classification Finally, we discuss future
directions in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 presents a discussion
and future research directions.
II. RELATED WORKS
Many service providers and password meters enforce users
to follow password policies in order to nudge users to create
a hard-to-crack password (Golla & Dürmuth, 2018) [9]. A
password meter that either guide or enforce users to comply
a stronger password at the moment of creation. For instance,
require meeting the minimum password policy. Such as, in-
cluding a minimum number of characters or special characters
and etcetera (Carnavalet & Mannan, 2015) [1]. At the moment
of creation, many studies and applied research on the human-
computer interaction are pointed to influence users to create a
stronger password. As well, many approved practical solutions
have a considerable effect on motivating users to create a
stronger password.
Nonetheless, many users tend to have password habits that
the cybersecurity does not recommend for many reasons;
either to create a memorable password or to not updating
their password regularly (Yıldırım & Mackie, 2019) [31].
Furthermore, most frequently used websites fail to either
oblige, encourage or influence users to follow the right path to
change these habits that the cybersecurity does not recommend
in the last decade (Furnell, 2018) [4].
On the other hand, involving human psychological be-
haviour to computer interaction on nudging the end-user, or
actively providing rich interactive feedback (at the moment
of password creation) had a significant effect on password
strength and user awareness (Furnell et al., 2018) [6]. Equally
on the same involvement, using an emoji-base with the text
feedback has a tangibly better performance on the password
length and the average password strength score [5].
Furthermore, on investigating the user’s behaviour of choos-
ing a weak and short password to be easy to memorise
[29] argue that the well understanding of a user’s memory
perception would increase the password memorability. Woods
and Siponen [29] have concluded that users can memorise
passwords more by understanding the memory perception. In a
like manner in a trade-off between password memorability and
user inconvenience. Woods and Siponen [29] experimented
that the user’s password recall and memorability have in-
creased from 40% to 70% by verifying the password twice to
verifying the password three times, without convincing users.
In the light of enhancing the end-user text feedback to study
the interactive text-feedback effect on the created password
strength, Seitz et al. [21] and Ur et al. [26] have concluded
that the combination of enriching an actionable text feed-
back, various password meter, various data-driven guidance
of explaining what is wrong with the inputted password and
some examples of enhancing the week password parts. This
guidance enhanced the inputted password and nudged the end-
user to create a stronger scale password. Equally important
on the password strength evaluation methods and usability.
Shay et al. [24] and Segreti et al. [20] recommended that
the password-meter base policy that combines special letters
with a longer-length. This recommendation will lead to a
fewer guessed and a more usable password — this built-
in recommendation comparison with enforcing the end-users
to follow a shorter length requirement with a comprehensive
policy.
According to Yiannis [30] and Galbally et al. [7], [8] on
highlighting the password strength and its time to crack,
several open-source tools and systems running in a general
machine could crack any password in less than an hour. This
case is possible in case of existing this password on any
dataset, for instance, password dictionaries.
Spotlighting the password dictionaries files and its efficiency
role on reducing the password cracking-time. There are many
New Password Cracking (NPC) techniques that are continually
working to improve dictionary attacks involving Artificial
Intelligence (AI). This technique reduces the searching time
within its billions of records Houshmand et al. [14].
Involving the dictionaries as a criterion for accepting pass-
word (blacklist password), Habib et al. [12] studied the user
interaction on rejecting his blacklisted attempted passwords.
Habib et al., found that the text feedback has more effective-
ness than rejecting users blacklisted password. As well, on
nudging users to create a stronger password through a different
approved technique, Furnell et al. [6] induced users to create
a stronger password by adding contextual information, at the
same time, tweaking the displayed warning messages to the
inputted password generating behaviours.
To shed a light on password meters accuracy and infer
the password strength calculation algorithms, in a purpose to
clear the user confusion while choosing a stronger password,
Carnavalet and Mannan [1] proposed an accurate meter that
measures the password strength, this meter has a different
calculation algorithm depending on many factors (blacklisted
passwords, commonly used passwords and the additional reg-
ular password mark by the regular meters).
Equally important, Guo and Zhang [10] produced an ac-
curate identification Lightweight Password Strength Estimator
(LPSE), that requires a small storage space at the client-side
(33 kilobits) and secure online service integration steps, LPSE
depends on many factors on password evaluation, this evalua-
tion is using the most advanced password-cracking algorithm
(0.181 ms running time). Also, it produces less false-negative
rate on both weak and secure passwords.
Spotlighting various available searching algorithms could
be used in a large dataset. TRIE & RABIN-KARP algorithms
have been approved to support large dataset (billion records)
searching time. This hybrid algorithm gained searching results
in seconds, according to Luo et al. [18], Gupta [11], and
Liu et al. [17]. Equally important on string match search, the
RABIN-KARP algorithm approved its time and text efficiency
on comparing strings on a large dataset [16], [22], [23].
Fig. 1. The proposed meter leaked password search function
III. DATASETS
This research is conducted using extensive and publicly
available datasets of compromised and leaked passwords. In
this part, we describe each of these datasets and summarize
them in Table I.
RockYou Dataset. This dataset contains over 32 million
compromised passwords that were leaked using an SQL injec-
tion attack that targeted RockYou web service in 2009. This
dataset is considered a goldmine due to the fact that RockYou
did not hash the passwords prior to the attack. In fact, the
leaked passwords were stored unencrypted in plaintext format
when attack happened. After removing duplicated passwords,
this dataset provided 14,341,564 unique plaintext passwords.
000Webhost Leak. A free web space provider, 000Web-
host, was hacked in 2015 by a cyber attack that exploited a
software vulnerability in an outdated PHP version. This attack
leaked 13 million plaintext passwords. The passwords in this
dataset are generally stronger than the RockYou dataset, as
000Webhost had a stronger minimum password policy that
enforced composing lowercase and digits passwords. This
dataset contains 714,173 unique plaintext passwords.
CrackStation Dictionary. This massive dictionary stores
a mapping between the hash of a password and the plaintext
password for that hash. The dictionary indexes these hashes to
optimize searching the dictionary for a given hash to recover
its plaintext password. If the hash of a given password is stored
in this dictionary, it takes less than a second to look-up its
plaintext password. This dictionary contains 15 billion entries
for MD5 and SHA1 hash functions, and 1.5 billion entries for
other hash functions.
IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we explain the design and steps to implement
and apply the proposed password meter.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF DATASETS
dataset year password number of
policy unique passwords
RockYou 2009 5+ 14,341,564
000Webhost 2016 6+ [a-Z][0-9] 714,173
CrackStation 2019 5+ 64,000,000
(human passwords only)
A. Passwords Collection and Preprocessing
If a password was leaked, then it does not matter if it
is strong as it will be cracked using dictionary attack or
wordlist based bruteforce preprocessing so first, we search
leaked databases, for this, we combined the three datasets
mentioned above into a massive database of leaked passwords
second, searching such dataset is a time consuming process. To
reduce the search time (look-up) for this step, we performed
the following steps:
1) Removed all duplicated passwords. In this step, we
retained only unique passwords and discarded duplicated
passwords. This reduced the datasets into the following
numbers.
2) Removed overlong passwords. Strange lengthy password
entries that are larger than 256 characters were removed
to maintain dataset with realistic human provided pass-
words.
3) Removed noisy entries. Some entries were words such as
”N/A” or a separating character such as a single comma
or semi-column ”,” or ”;”. We decided that such entries
are noise or misreadings that were introduced during
some part of data processing, and therefore, we removed
such entries.
B. Scoring Passwords Strength
We calculate the strength score for a provided password in
two steps: first, we identify phrases that are found in leaked
password databases, and then we apply measuring techniques
to provide the most accurate score for password strengths.
1) Identifying Compromised Passwords: A chosen pass-
word such as Abcde123@ or P@ssword1 is not considered
weak because of its characters nor complexity. In fact, they are
considered weak and insecure because they have been chosen
many times and are present in leaked password datasets. Such
passwords are used early in the password cracking process by
cyber attacks [27].
To identify common and leaked passwords, our approach
performs a comprehensive look-up in the collected databases
RockYou, 000Webhost, and CrackStation. If a chosen pass-
word by the user is found in the leaked databases, our approach
will directly label is as v́ery weak.́
Searching for a password (string) in large databases could
be a time consuming process. To provide an enhanced look-
up function that searches the three large datasets for a chosen
password, we developed a search function that combines the
Trie search tree with the RABIN-KARP algorithm [3]. We
explain each next.
RABIN-KARP. This string searching algorithm utilizes
hashing to find string patterns in text [3]. It works by cal-
culating the hash values for string patterns of length M to be
compared with a given string. By using this method, only one
comparison per string pattern (or sequence of characters) oc-
curs. The intuition behind this algorithm is that it preprocesses
the string pattern with M length (m sequence of characters) to
search that number (m) in the text and find an exact match of
that pattern.
Trie. This data structure can be visualized as a graph. This
graph starts with a root node that has 26 outgoing edges (one
for each letter in the English alphabet). First, strings are stored
in this structure in a top to bottom manner to associate the
length if a given string (word) to a specific level in the Trie.
This type of storage allows for efficient retrieval of strings by
traversing down a path of the tree. The time complexity to
do this top-down search depends on the string length that is
being searched for such that its runtime is O(n) where n is the
number of characters in the string.
It is noteworthy that in this work, to search for a provided
password in the three large datasets. First, apply the Trie
segmentation function on the three datasets. We implement
this segmentation to fragment the datasets in an alphabetical
manner. Then, we use RABIN-KARP on the unified database
segment that contains first letter of the provided password.
By splitting the database that combines the three leaked
password databases, into segments based on the first letter,
we consumed more space but achieved better retrieval times.
Figure 1 illustrates this process.
Optimization for the second search. If a user chooses a
password that is present in these databases, our system will
alert and influence the user to change the choose a different
password. For this reason, a second search is needed to look up
the new chosen password if the user decides to so. To further
enhance the performance of the second search process, for
the new password, we took advantage of the work of Zhang-
Kennedy et al. [32] which discovered that 50% of users re-
use the first letter of their previous password when they create
a new one. To take advantage of this finding, we retained
the searching index result of the first character in the user’s
password. By using this technique, if the user changes her
password, to enhance its security, our approach will be able
to perform the search operation of the second password at
much faster rate. To keep the memory from being depleted by
our system, we cleared this searching index result 10 seconds
after the user chooses a new password.
2) Measuring Password Strength: Traditional approaches
measure the entropy –a metric in information theory that
measures randomness in a given string (or password). Such
a metric might be misleading because its heavily affected by
common English words from the dictionary. In our approach,
such words will be identified and filtered by the previous step
that searches the three large datasets mentioned earlier. For
this reason, we take advantage of previous works which use
the number of guesses that the attacker would take to crack
the password. Therefore, We utilize the implementation of
Daniel Lowe password strength estimator, zxcvbn [28]. This
implementation measures the strength of a given password
by calculating the attacker’s worst case scenario that has
chosen the best available approach to crack the password (later
referred to as Time-to-Crack). This makes it a natural choice
for our work as it provides the time to crack a provided
password (in days, months, or years).
C. VISUAL DESIGN of the Password Meter
In this section, we describe our visual design of the pass-
word meter. The meter’s screen consists of three key com-
ponents. Figure x illustrates the components of the proposed
visual design of the meter. We explain each component next.
• Sliding Bar (slider). This bar displays the password
strength as a sliding scale where if the slider is at most-
left, it means that is is the weakest where most-right
means the strongest password.
• Text Feedback. The meter screen displays the time-to-
crack metric, which explains to the user the intuition
behind the the visual bar (slider) that represents the
strength of the password. This type of feedback provides
an important detail which shows the strength of the
password from an attacker’s point-of-view. Showing the
average time duration (hours to years) that would take the
cyber attack to crack the created password is an intuitive
method to influence users to choose stronger password.
• Visual Feedback (colors and emojis). To increase the
usability of the meter and support the older and younger
audience, the meters slider is highlighted with various
colors to represent the strength of the password (e.g., the
green color means a strong password, where red means a
weak password). Finally, the slider itself will be changed
to an emoji that represents the strength pf the created
password. A smiley-face emoji means a strong password,
and a face-screaming-in-fear emoji (most left in Figure
x) means a weak password was chosen.
V. USER SURVEY
To study the effectiveness of the proposed password meter
to inform users about the strength of their chosen password
and influence them to create stronger ones, we designed a user
study and ran experiments with the participation of real users.
This user study comprises of three steps: (1) determining the
appropriate sample size for the experiments, (2) using eye-
tracking technology to evaluate our meter’s ability to capture
users’ attention, and (3) the effectiveness of our meter to
influence users to create stronger passwords. We explain each
of these steps next.
A. Determining the Sample Size
Choosing a sample size that is appropriate for a given user
study is not a straightforward process. Determining a sample
size based on the size of the population has been extensively
discussed in the literature [2], [13], [15], [19], [25]. We use
the approach proposed by Stallard et al. [25] to determine our





where Z is the confidence level at 95% (standard value of
1.96). P is the estimated proportions of the study area. E is
range of confidence interval.
By using Equation 1, the appropriate sample size for this
study was calculated and it is 210 users.
We recruited 210 participants from the University of Sunder-
land for our study on password strength meter. All participants
who participated in this study were age 18+.
B. Eye-Tracking: Capturing Users’ Attention
Previous work showed that capturing the attention of users
is crucial for password meters to be effective at providing
any subsequent feedback. To this end, we investigate the
effectiveness of our proposed meter to capture the participant’s
attention using eye tracking technology.
In this experiment, Tobii Studio version 3.3.2 eye tracker
was used. This eye tracking technology keeps track of users’
eye movements and uses sensors to detect the focus points
of the user’s eyes on the screen content. The output of each
session of this experiment is a color-coded heatmap. This
heatmap represents the eye focus points on the screen content
using three colored main colors: Green, Yellow, and Red.
Green bubbles are used in situations when the eye focus of
the user was minimal. Yellow bubbles are used for moderate
eye focus, and the red bubbles represent high eye focus. We
present and discuss the results of these experiments in the next
section.
Fig. 2. Evaluation methodology
VI. EVALUATION
To obtain more accurate evaluation of of the strength of user
created passwords and the influence of our proposed meter,
first, we need to measure the effectiveness of our proposed
meter to capture the attention of our users. Second, we need
to measure the influence of our meter in terms of the number of
users who changed their passwords to be more secure. Figure
2 illustrates the evaluation methodology.
A. Effectiveness of Capturing Attention
Our first set of evaluation results show the effectiveness of
our proposed meter to capture the focus of participants when
they create passwords. Capturing users’ attention is the first
step towards influencing users to create stronger passwords.
Failing to capture users’ attention renders any subsequent steps
(e.g., providing feedback) pointless due to the fact that users
did not see them.
Therefore, we ran the eye tracking experiment using two
password meters: our proposed meter and a regular meter
(inspired by the work in [5]). Then, we compared the eye
focus heatmaps between these two password meter. Figures 3
and 4 show the heatmaps for using our proposed meter and
the regular meter, respectively.
Fig. 3. The cumulative user eye focus when using the proposed password
meter proposed algorithm
Fig. 4. The cumulative user eye focus when using the regular password meter
As shown by the Figure 3 and 4, our meter achieved a
better effectiveness at capturing users attention to both the
meter visual and the textual feedback on top right corner of
the webpage.
B. Measuring the influence on changing passwords
The measured effectiveness of our meter to capture users’
attention is a positive indicator of the overall effectiveness
of our proposed password meter. However, a key metric to
evaluate password meters is to measure the percentage of users
who actually changed their passwords based on the presented
feedback of the password meter. To this end, we captured two
data points: (1) the users’ created passwords before presented
with the feedback of the meter, and (2) the new chosen
passwords after presented with the proposal meter’s feedback.
TABLE II
THE IMPACT OF OUR PROPOSED METER ON THE STRENGTH OF USERS’
PASSWORDS (BEFORE & AFTER THE METER’S FEEDBACK)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Number of users 13 195 2
Average password 121.049 108.37 -0.46
cracking time difference years years years
Gained time-to- 333% 902% -901%
crack (in percentage)
We grouped the participants in this experiment into three
groups: Group 1 is comprised of users who had prior knowl-
edge and understanding of the time-to-crack for given pass-
words. The participants in Group 2 had no prior knowledge of
the time-to-crack for given passwords. The two participants in
Group 3 had partial knowledge about time-to-crack for given
passwords.
As shown by Table II, the participants in group 1 (with prior
knowledge about time-to-crack) changed their passwords after
seeing the feedback of our password meter. The average time-
to-crack for their passwords increased from 121.04 to 172.85
years which translates to 333% stronger passwords in terms
of years required by cyber attacks to crack these passwords.
Participants with no prior knowledge about time-to-crack
(Group 2) showed an outstanding improvement for their cre-
ated passwords after seeing the feedback of our password
meter. The average time-to-crack for their passwords increased
from 13.51 to 121.88 years which translates to passwords that
are 902% stronger in terms of years required by cyber attacks
to crack.
Group 3 is comprised of 2 participants with partial knowl-
edge about the time-to-crack. This group showed a decline of
901% for their password strengths after seeing the meter’s
feedback. The average time-to-crack decreased from 0.419
years (5 months) to 0.046 years (0.55 months or 16.7 days).
Unlike the groups 1 and 2, group 3 performed worse at creating
passwords after seeing the feedback of our password meter.
We believe the participants in this group provided abnormal
entries (or outliers). The main reason for this belief is that
this group created weak passwords in the first attempt (prior
seeing any feedback from our meter) despite group answers of
understanding the time-to-crack concept which is an anomaly.
Then, in the second attempt, group created much weaker
passwords despite the fact that our password meter displayed
the face-screaming-in-fear emoji.
VII. DISCUSSION
The experiments in this study show that our password meter
takes an important step to detect, warn, and educate users
about password creation and password strength importance to
authentication-based security.
Target groups. Our evaluation shows that the proposed
meter influenced a large number of participants to create
significantly stronger passwords. However, based on the user
study, participants who did not have prior knowledge about
the time-to-crack concept and how it related to the security
of authentication-based systems, showed an outstanding im-
provement that translated into 900% improvement of chosen
passwords. Therefore, we believe that the proposed meter
performs very well at educating and influencing users with
little or no prior knowledge about the time-to-crack concept.
Error/Mis-influence analysis. Surprisingly, participants with
partial knowledge about the time-to-crack concept, performed
worse after seeing the proposed meter’s feedback. While these
entries could be outliers, however, this decline might be due
to misconceptions users have about the time-to-crack. If this is
the case, then removing prior misconceptions of participants
could an area of improvement for the proposed meter.
VIII. FUTURE WORK
Data-driven password meters depend profoundly on search-
ing datasets of leaked passwords. In this work, we combined
three large datasets into one database and used an innovative
search function to perform rapid look-up operations for leaked
passwords. One future direction to improve on our approach
is to gather more datasets of leaked passwords and English
words from websites such as KAGGLE and STATISTA, and
then test the performance of the search functions on big data.
An innovative integration of users’ password habits and big
data (for password look-ups) is a promising direction for future
research.
As mentioned earlier, we used the Tobii Studio version
3.3.2 for the eye-tracking experiments. There are various and
more up-to-date tools that provide the state-of-the-art eye-
tracking technology that may provide more accurate results for
measuring users’ attention, not only on workstations, but also,
on tables, mobile phones and other electronics. Such research
becomes a necessity with the rapid increase of using mobile
devices for account and password creation.
IX. CONCLUSION
The future will have many alternative authentication meth-
ods alongside passwords, but passwords will always be there;
users are required to use the type of authentication method that
was chosen by the system developers, and today passwords
are the most common method used. The method used in this
paper investigated the percentage of the improvement in the
number of influenced users while creating their password. We
then analysed the resulted inputted password on our real web
service system. As well we have contributed a new searching
algorithm to search in a large dataset to be used as a first
checkpoint of the end-user inputted password. As a result, we
have concluded that our contributed meter has influenced 88%
of our participants to create passwords that take in average 150
years to crack.
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